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PROTECTION FOR DEBENTURE HOLDERS
SEVmRAL spectacular collapses of top-heavy corporate structures have recent-
ly revealed the dubious character of safety provisions in debentures." Deben-
tures have been widely used,2 and they may perform an economic service in
increasing the variety of media for financing. They provide the issuing corpor-
ation greater freedom in the control of its assets than do mortgage bonds, and
command smaller return than preferred stock, being theoretically less in risk.
Debentures typically are unsecured obligations,3 but various devices have
been used in the attempt to increase their apparent security. These devices
often take the form of covenants between the issuer and the holder, or the
issuer, holder and a trustee.4 One such covenant, commonly called the nega-
1. See notes 14, 22, 25, 60, and 64, infra.
2. An analysis of domestic debentures listed in MooDY's MANUALS OF INDUSrnmALS,
PuuLic UTILITIES, and BANKS AND FINANCE for the years 1929, 1930, and 1931, pre-
pared for Prof. Saxon of Yale shows 845 issues in existence during this periol.
3. DEWING, FINANCIAL PoLc OF CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1934) 105; STErsoN Er AL.,
1 SoME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION, AND REGULATION
(1930) 66-69. In this Comment, no attempt is made at a narrow definition of "de-
benture". It is not a term of art, but is used loosely to cover several types of corporate
seurity. See WVALuSLEY, COMPANY LAw (1931) 111; 1 QUINDnY, BoNDs AN BOND-
HOLDERS (1934) § 5.
4. Of the 845 debenture issues mentioned in note 2, supra, 577 contained some sort
of restrictive covenant.
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tive pledge clause, is a promise by the issuing corporation not to pledge or
mortgage any of its assets; the promise is normally either absolute, prohibit-
ing all such pledges and mortgages, or restricted to a prohibition of pledg-
ing or mortgaging without allowing the debenture holders an equal lien.,
Often loans for less than one year, contracted in the usual course of business,
are excepted from the scope of the negative pledge clause.6 Another common
covenant is a promise by the issuer not to incur any obligations which would
cause its total indebtedness to exceed a specified percentage of the value of
its assets.7 Violation of these covenants may accelerate the maturity date of
the issue. As a further protection, a bank is often made trustee of the issue
under an indenture.8 Some "debentures" are secured by deposit of collateral
with the trustee.9 Usually a broad power of substitution of collateral is re-
tained by the issuer, and the duties ordinarily imposed upon the trustee by
the trust indenture are negligible. Furthermore, indentures almost invariably
extend to trustees immunity from liability arising from all contingencies
except gross negligence or bad faith.10
Restrictive covenants and trust indentures, nominally written for the pro-
tection of debenture holders, are drafted by the issuer, who is interested in
retaining a maximum of control over its assets, by the trustee, who seeks
to avoid the imposition of liability, and by the house of issue, which is
primarily interested in marketability. 1 Indentures are lengthy, formidable
documents, and covenants are couched in technical and involved language.
Since these provisions could be understood by few investors, and since, in any
event, the purchase of securities by well-informed investors is based chiefly on
an analysis of the earning position of the issuer, rather than on covenants or
other contractual provisions, there is practically no pressure of purchaser opin-
ion to improve these covenants. The position of the purchaser of such deben-
5. This promise may take the affirmative form, i.e., a promise to give debenture
holders an equal lien if assets should be pledged or mortgaged.
6. Good examples are set out in Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 11 F.
Supp. 497, 502, n.2 (S. D. N.Y. 1935); Chase National Bank v. Sweezy, 281 N.Y.
Supp. 487, 490 (Sup. Ct. 1931); SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE CoMlMISSION, REPORT ON
THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORE, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS
OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, PART VI, TRUSTEES UNDER IN-
DENTURES (1936) 10, n.17.
7. See Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 497, 502, n.3 (S.
D. N.Y. 1935); DEWING, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 108.
8. A situation described in Chase National Bank v. Sweezy, 281 N. Y. Supp. 487
(Sup. Ct. 1931); Kaplan v. Chase National Bank, 156 Misc. 471, 281 N.Y. Supp. 825
(Sup. Ct. 1934); Gardiner, Corporate Bonds, Mortgages, Collateral Trusts, and De-
benture Indentures, 27, in 8 SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING (1931).
9. Of the 845 debenture issues mentioned in note 2, supra, 44 were secured in some
manner.
10. See note 62 infra and S. E. C. op. cit. supra note 6, at 68, 69.
11. S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 6, at 5; and see Green v. Title Guarantee and Trust
Co., 223 App. Div. 12, 16, 227 N.Y. Supp. 252, 257 (1st Dep't, 1928), aff'd, 248 N.Y.
627, 162 N.E. 552 (1928).
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tures is analogous to that of a purchaser of a railroad ticket containing claus-
es exempting -the carrier from liability,12 or that of an insured accepting the
provisions of a policy carefully drawn by the insurer.13 Courts and legis-
latures have seen fit to protect the individual from the injury to which his
obviously unequal bargaining position exposes him in the latter two in-
stances, and recent developments indicate the necessity for such protection in
the case of debenture holders. The debenture holder may attempt to enforce
the rights nominally assured him by contract in a variety of actions, few
of which promise success.
Where a negative pledge clause is relied upon, and no trustee exists for
the protection of the debenture holders, the first problem facing the de-
benture holder who would bring any type of suit is that of whether the
negative pledge covenant has been violated. In Kelly v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Company'4 one of the holders of $66,000,000 of debentures
of the Insull Utilities Investment, Inc., brought a class suit to recover ?ssets
of that company which had been pledged with banks as security for short-
term loans of $17,000,000 contracted in 1931, or alternately, to be secured
in those assets equally and ratably with the banks. The debentures contained
a prohibition against the pledge of assets unless the debentures were ratably
scured 15 and an absolute restriction upon borrowings in excess of 50% of
the value of the assets of the issuer.-' The debentures provided that the
principal amount would become due if a violation of any of the covenants
continued for 60 days. No provision was n-ade for a trustee of these deben-
tures. The theory of the plaintiff's action, brought after the I. U. I. collapse
in 1932, was that the loans from the banks had violated the 50% clause of
the debentures and that the pledge of stock securing those loans violated the
negative pledge clause, which violations, plaintiff argued, entitled her in
equity to recover from the banks, which allegedly knew of the restrictions
in the debentures. Judge Mack held that neither covenant had been violated.
The negative pledge clause in question provided that: "The company
hereby covenants . . . that . . . it will not mortgage or pledge any of
its property unless the instrument creating such mortgage or pledge shall
provide that this debenture shall be secured thereby equally and ratably with
all other obligations issued or to be issued thereunder, except that the com-
pany without so securing this debenture (a) may at any time mortgage or
pledge any of its property for the purpose of securing loans to the company
12. GODDARD, OUTLINES OF THE LAW oF BA ILENTS AND CMuMERS (2d ed. 1928)
§ 266; HurcmIxso, CARRIERs (3d ed. 1906) § 450.
13. See Patterson, Administrative Control of Insurance Policy Forms (1925)
25 COL. L. REv. 253. For statutory definition of contract terms in mortgages and
bonds, see N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW, § 254.
14. 11 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1935). Discussed in Comments (1936) 49 HAnv.
L. REv. 620, (1935) 30 ILL. L. REv. 487, (1936) 22 VA. L. Rnv. 440; and Note (1936)
36 COL. L. Rmv. 319.
15. Id. at 502, n. 2.
16. Id. at 502, n. 3.
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coo:tracted in the usual course of business for periods not exceeding one
year . ." Judge Mack held that the clause clearly referred to the crea-
tion of a funded debt secured by a mortgage or trust instrument. Since the
short term bank loans did not fall within the prohibition of the clause so
construed, the pledge of stock to secure those loans did not violate the cove-
nant. Under this interpretation of the negative pledge clause Judge Mack
was compelled to hold that the exception of loans made "in the usual course
of business" was surplusage and could have no application to the facts of
the Kelly case. 17
Upon appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals cast considerable doubt upon
Judge Mack's interpretation of the negative pledge clause.,, That court
remanded the case to the court below for findings upon two issues on which
Judge* Mack had not passed, one of which was whether the loans to the
banks were made in the ordinary course of business. The request by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for a finding on this issue suggests that Judge
Mack's interpretation of the negative pledge clause as applying only to
funded indebtedness might be overruled; for the provision allowing loans in
the usual course of business, as an exception to the negative pledge clause,
becomes pertinent only if the court regards .the loans as otherwise within
the prohibition of the covenant. The determination of whether these loans
were or were not in the usual course of business 9 will require careful analy-
sis of the circumstances under which these loans were incurred, against the
background of the financial latitude required by the I. U. I., a top holding
company, in its major activity of raising funds and trading in lhrge blocks
of stocks, often representing the effective control of operating companies.
20
Action predicated upon the violation of the 507 clause presents further
difficulties. The I. U. I. covenanted with its debenture holders that "it
will not create or assume any additional indebtedness if as a result thereof
17. Id. at 504.
18. 85 F. (2d) 61 (C. C.A..2d, 1936). In an intermediate decision [14 F. Supp. 346
(S. D. N. Y. 1936) ] Judge Mack held that since a trial judge was not required to make
findings on all questions presented by evidence, a statement of evidence is properly
prepared under Equity Rule 75 if it contains only evidence essential to findings and
conclusions of the trial judge.
19. Comment (1936) 49 HAnv. L. REv. 620, 622. The similar exception of notes
maturing within not more than one year, upon which the defendant relied in Kaplan
y. Chase Nat. Bank, 156 Misc. 471, 281 N.Y. Supp. 825 (Sup. Ct. 1934) was easily
dismissed by Steuer, J.: "Defendant claimed that the demand notes were paid by the
$10,000,000 note, and hence there was no outstanding indebtedness for a year. Under
the circumstances, the question is undoubtedly one of intent. The intent found here was
one to avoid the provisions of the indentures which was accomplished by stamping the
notes paid and indulging in the other mummeries of banking practice".
See the interpretation of usual course of business in Wheatley v. Silkstone & Haigh
Moor Coal Co., 29 Ch. D. 715 (Ch. D. 1885) (no negative pledge covenant); Brunton
v. Electrical Engineering Corp. [1892] 1 Ch. 434 (Ch. D. 1891); In re Automatic
Bottle Makers, Ltd. [1926] 1 Ch. 412 (C.A.).
20. For a description of the regular cycle in which I. U. I. operated, see Comment
(1936) 22 VA. L. REv. 440, 443.
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its total indebtedness will exceed 50%1 of the then value of its assets". Most
of the bank loans at issue in the Kelly case were used to pay off existing
indebtedness of the I. U. I., and as to them Judge Mack held that the 50%
clause was not violated since in a refinancing operation no "additional in-
debtedness" is created.&2 A further difficulty in proving the violation of a
507 clause is the question of proof of the value of assets of the issuer, a
question involving complex and technical accounting problems.
Transferr;ng assets to and between subsidiaries in order to circumvent
negative pledge clauses makes proof of violation even more difficult than
in the Kelly case. An issue of $25,000,000 of debenture bonds by the Pam-
mount-Publix: Corporation 22 provided that "So long as any of the Bonds
shall be outstanding the Corporation will not create, or permit the creation of,
any mortgages or other lien upon any property or assets directly owned by
the Corporation, without equally and ratably securing the Bonds there-
under". 23 In 1932 Paramount-Publix had a large stock of film under pro-
duction, but was without the working capital to finish the pictures. In
order to obtain a loan of $4,275,000 from various banks for this purpose
and to secure existing short term loans of $9,600,000, the corporation trans-
ferred the assets relating to the films to a subsidliary created for the sole
purpose of holding them, and this subsidiary paid the parent for these assets
by notes which the parent endorsed to the banks. This transaction technically
did not constitute a violation of the negative pledge clause, for no mortgage
or lien had been created upon any assets. The notes of the subsidiary which
Paramount-Publix endorsed to the banks were unsecured promises payable
generally out of the assets of the subsidiary. But the only assets of the sub-
sidiary were those which had been transferred to it by Paramount-Publix to
give substance to its promise to the banks. The obligation of the subsidiary
to the banks gave the barks a direct claim upon those assets in case of de-
fault, and in this .aar. er the debenture holders were neatly and effectively
insulated from the assets upon which Paramount-Publix had promised not
to place any mortgage or other lien.
24
The Securities and Exchange Commission'- investigation of the reorgani-
zation of the Cuban Cane Sugar Corporation revealed another indirect cir-
cumvention of a negative pledge clause through the manipulation of sub-
sidiaries.25 In 1920 Cuban Cane issued $25,000.000 of debentures containing
a restrictive clause covenanting not to create any mortgage or lien on its
property except in the acquisition of properties or in renewals of existing
21. 11 F. Supp. 497, 506 (S.D. N.Y. 1935).
22. S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 6, at 11.
23. Id. at 10, n. 17.
24. The debenture holders were further "protected" in this case by the e'istence of
an indenture and a trustee, the Chase Bank. But the Chase Bank was a trustee without
substantial duties, and was under no obligation to act nor did it act for the debenture
holders in this instance. Id. at 13.
25. Id. at 98.
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liens. At that time Cuban Cane was the sole stockholder of the Violet Sugar
Company, the principal asset of which was the Violetta Mill, one of the
most valuable sugar properties in Cuba. In 1921 the price of sugar dropped
from 21 to 1Y2 cents a pound. As conditions imposed by New York
banks to secure a $10,000,000 rescue loan, in that same year holders of
$17,800,000 of the debentures agreed to subordinate their claims and Cuban
Cane agreed to pay off the loan by the flotation of mortgage bonds.20 Pursuant
to this agreement Cuban Cane caused Eastern Cuba Sugar Corporation,
another wholly owned subsidiary, to issue $10,000,000 of mortgage bonds
which were sold by Cuban Cane to its stockholders and underwriters. These
mortgage bonds were secured in part by the Violetta Mill, which Cuban
Cane had caused to be transferred from the Violet Company to Eastern
Cuba for this purpose. Since the Violetta Mill had been owned through a
subsidiary and not directly by Cuban Cane, counsel were confident that the
negative pledge clause was not being violated.2 7 Nonetheless the fact remains
tfiat in spite of the safety provisions of the debentures a valuable asset held
by a wholly owned subsidiary of Cuban Cane at the time the debentures were
issued was subjected to a mortgage two years later without ratably securing
the debenture holders. Some light upon the effectiveness of the negative
pledge clause in this situation is shed by the fact that in 1935 debenture
holders were offered the alternative of becoming stockholders in a re-
organized company by the payment of $10 a share or of receiving $2.50
or $3.00 in full settlement for each $1000 debenture, while bank creditors
whose short term loans were secured emerged with ownership of the new
company.28 The Paramount-Publix and Cuban Caiie cases present graph-
ically the sharp conflict of interest between the issuer and debenture holders
where, on the one hand, a negative pledge clause purports to. restrict the
issuer in the control of its assets, and, on the other, the exigencies of busi-
ness demand the pledge of those assets ;2' and furthermore, indicate a tech-
nique whereby issuers may perhaps circumvent such clauses with impunity.
Although the transfer of assets to a subsidiary for the purpose of giving
certain creditors a preferred status with respect to those assets accomplishes
the same result as a direct pledge of the assets to the creditors, the legal
grounds upon which such a transaction can be voided are most uncertain.
In a few cases where assets were transferred to a subsidiary solely for the
purpose of preferring certain creditors, courts have treated the assets of the
subsidiary as indistinguishable from those of the parent in order to permit
the creditors of the parent to share ratably with the creditors of the subsidiary
26. Proceedings before the S. E. C. In the matter of Cuban Cane Sugar Corporation
(1935) at 58.
'7. Id. at 70-77.
28. S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 6, at 93.
29. Id. at 13, 99.
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in those assets. 0 On the other hand, courts have also refused to disregard
the corporate entity of the subsidiary where the forms of corporate activity
and of the transfer were meticulously followed. 3' And in a very recent case,
although the court decided to disregard the corporate entity of the subsidiary,
its creditors were allowed to recover in full on the theory that their action
in accepting the substitution of the subsidiary as a debtor was beneficial to
the corporation in a period of stress.
32
But assuming that the debenture holder can prove a clear violation of
the negative pledge clause, his troubles have then just begun. If by some
chance he has discovered the intent of the issuer to violate the covenant
before the transaction is completed and, instead of selling his debenture,
decides to incur the expense of suit, it is doubtful whether he is entitled to
an injunction, or must wait for the violation to be completed and then sue
for damages.3 3 The provision for acceleration of the debenture because of a
violation may prevent the granting of an injunction 4 These questions are
not likely to be settled because the fact of violation seldom becomes known
to debenture holders until it is fully consummated. Then the remedy against
the issuer, either of damages or of acceleration, if provided, is clearly ob-
tainable, but seldom of any value because the facts revealing the violation
usually become known only when the issuer is insolvent.
There remains to be considered only the remedy against the pledgees who
took assets in violation of the covenant, which must consist of something in
the nature oi ,a equital .e lizn upoa these i-sets in favor of the debenture
30. Hamilton Ridge Lumber Sales Corp. v. Wilson, 25 F. (2d) 592 (C. C.A. 4th,
1928); First Nat. Bank of Durham v. Raleigh Savings Bank & Trust Co., 37 F. (2d)
301 (C. C. A. 4th. 1930) (stock of subsidiary pledged as collateral); cf. N. Y. Trust
Co. v. Island Oil & Transport Co., 56 F. (2d) 580 (C. C, A. 2d, 1932) (no intent to
prefer subsidiary's creditors).
31. Carson v. Lng Bell Lumber Corp., 73 F. (2d) 397 (C.C.A. 8th, 1934);
Wagoner v- Wallace Turnbull Corp., 306 Pa. 442, 160 Atl. 105 (1932); First Nat.
Bank of Seattle v. Walton, 146 Wash. 367, 262 Pac. 984 (1928).
32. Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F. (2d) 478 (C. C.A. 8th, 1935); cert.
dencd 296 U. S. 614 (1935), raodifying Woodbury v. Pickering Lumber Co., 10 F. Supp.
761 (W.D. Mo. 1933), (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 717.
33. In Holmes v. St. Joseph Lead Co.. 84 Misc. 278, 147 N. Y. Supp. 104 (Sup. Ct.
1914) aff'd 163 App. Div. 885, 147 N.Y. Supp. 1117 (1914), stockholders sued to enjoin
the sale of a debenture issue which would have given the company power to violate an
earlier negative pledge covenant, but the court held that no rights under the negative
pledge covenant were violated until the power was exercised. It would appear clear,
however, that an injunction against a pledge under a complete negative pledge clause,
or specific performance of an agreement to allow an equal lien, would be decreed if
suit were brought before the rights of third parties were involved. See Connecticut
Co. v. N. Y., N.H. & H. R. R. 94 Conn. 13, 45, 107 AtI. 646, 657 (1919) ; Knott v. Shep-
herdstown Mfg. Co., 30 WV. Va. 790, 796, 5 S. E. 266, 269 (188).
34. See Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 497, 510 (S.D.
N.Y. 1935) and cases there cited.
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holders. 35 An equitable lien is a remedial device which has been used to
establish claims against specific property in the most diverse situations.80 It
may be enforced against a person making a promise, or whose acts give rise
to an implied promise, upon which the lien is based.37 Such a lien is good
against anyone but an innocent purchaser without notice, and can be proved
in bankruptcy against the trustee, whose status under the Bankruptcy Act
does not carry immunity against such equities. 3 8 Thus the lienor may ob-
tain a preferance as against other general creditors, who had no knowledge
of the facts upon which the lien was based, but who are, in the judgment
of the court, less entitled to a claim against the particular asset to which
the lien is attached.
3 9
In the Kelly case, Judge Mack concluded that the debenture covenants
did not give rise to an equitable lien, or any other kind of equitable charge on
the assets in favor of the debenture holders. 40 His opinion does not seem
clearly to distinguish the several related situations in which equitable liens
have been considered, nor to exploit adequately the promise of the cases
with respect to the issue. While it is often said that a promise not to do some-
thing with respect to property does not give the promisee a claim to the
property,41 a promise with affirmative implications, like a promise to secure
35. Throughout this discussion, it should be kept in mind that, if the covenants were
avoided by a transfer of assets to a subsidiary, the only way in which the debenture
holders might be restored to their protected position is by disregarding the corporate
entity of the subsidiary, supra notes 30, 31, and that once this is done there is no question
of equitable lien, since creditors of subsidiary and parent share equally in the assets
of both. But see note 32, supra.
36. Britton, Equitable Liens-A Tentative Analysis of the Problem (1930) 8 N. C. L.
REV. 388; Comments, (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 1335; (1934) 32 Micu. L. REv. 685.
37. Connecticut Co. v. N.Y., N. H. & H. R. R.. 94 Conn. 13, 107 At. 646 (1919).
A common example is the support and maintenance case. McKnight v. McKnight, 212
'Mich. 318, 180 N. W. 437 (1920).
38. Voltz v. Treadway & Marlatt. 59 F. (2d) 643 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932) ; Tobin v.
Insurance Agency Co., 80 F. (2d) 241 (C. C. A. 8th. 1935). But see Penn Lumber
Co. v. Wilson, 26 F. (2d) 893, 895 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928).
39. A closely analogous situation appears in the English law of floating charges as
applied to debenture issues: These charges fix upon insolvency, and give the debenture
holders a lien superior to that of general creditors. In re The Panama, New Zealand. and
Australian Royal Mail Co., Ltd. L. R. 5 Ch. App. 318 (Ch. 1870) ; In re Florence
Land and Public Works Co., 10 Ch. D. 530 (C. A. 1878) ; In re Colonial Trusts Cor-
poration, 15 Ch. D. 465 (M. R. 1879); Wheatley v. Silkstone & Haigh Moor Coal Co.,
29 Ch. D. 715 (Ch. D. 1885) ; Robson v. Smith [1895] 2 Ch. 118 (Ch. D.) ; Government
Stock & Other Sec. Inv. Co. v. Manila Ry. Co., Ltd., [1897] A. C. 81 (H. L. 1896);
In re Borax Co. [1899] 2 Ch. 130 (Ch. D.) ; Evans v. Rival Granite Quarries, Ltd.
[1910] 2 K. B. 979 (C. A.); In re Crompton & Co., Ltd. [19141 1 Ch. 954 (Ch. D.)
40. 11 F. Supp. 497, 307, 511 (S. D. N.Y. 1935). The minor grounds of the opinion,
that the defendant was not liable for non-inducing breach of contract nor for participating
in a breach of trust, are not discussed here, as they do not seem to raise any possibili-
ties of recovery by debenture holders.
41. Knott v. Shepherdstown Mfg. Co., 30 W. Va. 790; 5 S. E. 266 (1888); B. Kup-
penheimer & Co. v. Mornin, 78 F. (2d) 261 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S.
615 (1935); (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 329.
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debenture holders equally if any pledge or mortgage of the property is sub-
sequently made, or its equivalent, a promise not to pledge or mortgage to
others without ratably securing the debenture holders, has been regarded as
an affirmative covenant giving rise to a valid present interest in the prop-
erty.4 Under these cases, Judge Mack might easily have considered the
covenants in the Kelly case as being affirmative, and giving rise to an
equitable lien.43 Alternatively, several courts, shifting the emphasis, have
enforced what they called equitable liens on property on the ground that
when the underlying contract to give security was enforceable in equity, the
promisee has an interest like a lien in the property which he might have had
appropriated to secure his promise.44 This view of an equitable lien, in-
ferred from a right to equitable enforcement of a contract for security,
requires that the contract be in fact enforceable in equity before the lien
can be recognized: that is, plaintiff must show that his remedy at law on
the promise is inadequate. Judge Mlack in the Kelly case considered the
acceleration clause in the debenture, which might have been enforced in the
event of a breach while the issuer was solvent, as an adequate remedy at
law, precluding both an injunction against breach and the recognition of an
equitable lien based on the right to an injunction. In the Sweeay case, a lien
in favor of the debenture holders was enforced, under circumstances almost
identical with the state of facts in the Kelly case, by construing the covenant
as being both affirmative and enforceable by equitable remedies. Circum-
stances which Judge Mack regarded as providing an adequate remedy at
law-the possibility of acceleration while the issuer was still solvent 4:-
were there directly held not to bar injunctive relief.40
Whatever the nature of the lien, it is commonly said that an equitable
lien is enforceable only against those who take assets subject to the lien
with know¢ledge of the contract underlying the lien.47 The plaintiff in the
Kelly case attempted to charge the defendant banks with knowledge of the
42. Connecticut Co. v. New York, N.H., & H. R.IL, 94 Conn. 13, 107 At. 646
(1919); Chase Nat. Bank v. Sweezy, 281 N.Y. Supp. 487 (Sup. Ct., 1931), aff'd, 261
N.Y. 710, 185 N.E. 803 (1933).
43. The Sscezy case is not discussed by Judge Mack in its bearing upon te possible
affirmative construction of the conditional negative pledge in the Kelly case. The two
cases reach opposite results on substantially identical covenants.
44. M1c'Murray v. Moran, 134 U. S. 150 (1890); Great Lakes & St. La.rer.ce Transp.
Co. v. Scranton Coal Co. 239 Fed. 603 (C. C. A. 7th, 1917).
45. 11 F. Supp. 497, 511 (S. D. N.Y. 1935).
46. There was an acceleration clause in the Swceezy case, quoted infra, note 52, but
since it was not stated in the opinion the holding of the Swccy case on this point
xas misconstrued in the Kclly case. Comment (1936) 49 Htnv. L. Rsv. 620, 624.
47. M1cfurray v. Moran, 134 U. S. 150 (1890); Wilson v. Kelland [1910] 2 Ch.
305. See Tobin v. Insurance Agency Co., 80 F. (2d) 241, 243 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935);
Valley State Bank v. Dean, 97 Colo. 151, 156, 47 P. (2d) 924, 927 (1935); McFerran
v. Louisville Title Co.'s Rec'r, 254 Ky. 362, 366, 71 S. W. (2d) 655, 657 (1934);
1 JoNEs, LiEns (3rd ed. 1914) § 1048.
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negative pledge clause in several ways. It was shown that the banks subscribed
to Moody's Manuals which contained descriptions of the debentures and
their terms, that there were in the credit files of the banks copies of annual
statement of I. U. I. which revealed the existence, though not the terms of
the debentures, and that most of the banks held some of these debentures in
trust accounts or as collateral for brokers' loans.48  However, since Judge
Mack found organic difficulties in the way of establishing an equitable lien,
he did not think it necessary to pass upon the question of knowledge. Upon
appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case and requested that
the lower court pass upon the question of whether the banks had knowledge
of the restrictive covenants in the bond debentures. 49  It is a reasonable
inference from this decision that the Circuit Court of Appeals disagrees
with Judge Mack's holding that an equitable lien did not exist; for the issue
of knowledge becomes relevant in this connection only when the attempt is
made to enforce an acknowledged lien..
Since it would be very difficult to prove actual knowledge in the case of
a large bank, it could reasonably be held that the circumstances surrounding
the granting of a loan by such a bank raise a presumption of knowledge, not
only of the existence of the debentures, but also of restrictive covenants
contained in them.50 The availability of balance sheets which would in-
dicate the existence of debentures, and the usual practice of carefully exam-
ining such documents before extending credits, the listing of the terms of
restrictive covenants in financial manuals, and all the facilities of a well-
organized credit department, create so favorable an opportunity for a bank
to learn the existence and terms of these covenants, that it can hardly claim
protection as an innocent holder.
It is true that an initial decision imposing liability on pledgees would appear
to inflict a heavy penalty on the immediate defendant in order to impose a
48. 11 F. Supp. 497, 502 n. 5 (S. D. N.Y. 1935).
49. Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 85 F. (2d) 61 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
50. Suggestions of such a presumption appear in several recent cases. "Therefore,
in the conclusions here reached, I have taken as the knowledge of the defendant on
fl-- date of the -,ibstitutn, the sum total of all the knowledge and information which
its various officers themselves had, as officers, and also the material which was contained
in the various credit and investment files of the bank on that date." Hazzard v. Chase
Nat. Bank. 159 Misc. 57, 75, 287 N.Y. Supp. 541, 561 (Sup. Ct. 1936). "The defendant
-ought to prove that some of its officials who were in charge of its trust department
had no knowledge of the fact that it was a creditor of the debtor and was receiving
money from the latter and also that it had property of the latter in its possession. It
was not established that there was not someone connected with the defendant who knew
all of these facts . . . " Starr v. Chase Nat. Bank, N.Y. L. J. September 21, 1936,
p. 77' col. 6 (Sup. Ct.) ". . . the party taking the security was the very bank
wl ich. as trustee under the indenture, must be held to have had actual knowledge of
its terms.* Caiase Nat. Baiik v. Sweezy, 281 N.Y. Supp. 487, 491 (Sup. Ct. 1931),
aft'd, 261 N.Y. 710, 185 N. E. 803 (1933). See also Comments, (1935) 30 ILL. L. REv.
487, 489; (1936) 36 CoL. L. REv. 658. Knapp v. Bailey, 79 Me. 195, 9 Atl. 122 (1887) ;
Earl of Sheffield v. London Joint Stock Bank, 13 A. C. 333 (1888). Contra: English
& Scottish Mercantile Co. v. Brunton [18921 2 Q. B. 700; In re Valletort Sanitary
Steam Laundry [1903] 2 Ch. 654.
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rule that knowledge will be presumed, but it is only by the imposition of
such penalties in initial cases that legal growth takes place. Nor should it be
overlooked that, if debenture holders are denied recovery against creditor
pledgees, the rule established, i.e., that the purchaser of debentures should
read carefully the restrictive covenants, that he should realize that, in view
of the difficulty of establishing actual knowledge, he can probably recover
for violation only against the issuer, and therefore that he should keep in
close contact with all the business operations of the issuer so that he will
know when to sue, can have little actual effect upon future conduct. On the
other hand, if a bank is heavily penalized once for taking a pledge in violation
of a covenant, other banks and their lawyers may reasonably be expected to
take adequate precautions in all future loans to corporations which have
outstanding debenture issues.
If a trustee has been provided to assert the rights of the debenture holders
under negative pledge or 50% clauses, the methods by which debenture
holders' rights may be asserted are somewhat changed. The problems of
proving violation of the covenants, the doctrinal difficulties with equitable
liens, and the necessity for a presumption of knowledge, remain as stated
above, but the power to sue is vested in the trustee rather than in the indi-
vidual debenture holders.51 The trustee may be given power to accelerate the
debentures upon default or violation of the covenants, but is ordinarily under
no duty to do so unless such action is required by a specified percentage
of the debenture holdersY21 It may sue to collect the debentures or to enforce
their covenants md is required to do so upon the request of a percentage of
holders and a proffer of indemnity for the expenses of suit.sa Only after
refusal of the trustee to act after proper request may an individual holder
do so.- These requirements of unified action by a percentage of holders and
51. Gardiner, loc. cit. supra note 8. Dz~vxo, op. cit. mipra note 3, at CO.
52. The record before the New York Court of Appeals in Chase Nat. Bank v. Sweezy,
261 N.Y. 710 (1933) contains an example of this type of indenture at p. 445. It reads,
p. 460, "If one or more of the following events, herein called the events of default,
shall happen [six conditions, including default of interest for 30 days or of principal
and non-performance of covenants for 60 days, are then listed] . . . the Trustee may,
and upon the written request of the holders of a majority in amount of the bonds . . *
it shall, declare the principal of all the bonds to be immediately due and payable."
QuixDRY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 138.
53. Id. at 463. "If the Company shall fail after written demand therefor by the
Trustee to pay forthwith any amounts due from the Company, . . . the Trustee . . .
shall be entitled to, and upon the written request of the holders of not less than 25%
in amount of the bonds . . . and upon being furnished with indemnity satisfactory to
it . . . it shall, institute such proceedings at law or equity as may be necessary for
the collection of the sums so due and unpaid, and/or for specific performance of this
Indenture or other appropriate relief." QUINDRY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 200.
54. Id. at 465. "No holder of any bond or coupon issued hereunder shall have the
right to institute any suit . . . unless such holder shall previously have given to the
trustee written notice of any existing default and of the continuance thereof as herein
provided, nor unless, also, the holders of not less than twenty-five percent in amount
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request to the trustee may often result in delay as or greater than that in
cases where there is no trustee. Since the trustee is under no duty to act
upon its own initiative, and since it may not be advised of the violation in
sufficient time, it is not likely to bring suit against the issuer to enjoin
breach, 5r or to recover after breach and before insolvency. If then the sole
remedy is that against pledgees, the trustee is in no better legal position to
pursue this remedy than are the individual holders. These holders may, how-
ever, recover in certain cases against the trustee. In the recent case of Starr v.
Chase National Bank 6 the failure of the trustee to act to protect noteholders
after default was held to impose liability upon the trustee on the ground
that the duties of the trustee became active upon default of interest, in spite
of the fact that the trustee was, under the indenture, under no duty to act
unless requested to do so, and was exempted from all liability for anything
except gross negligence or bad faith. If this rule could be applied where the
default consisted of violation of a restrictive covenant, then when the trustee
failed to act with reasonable diligence the debenture holders might recover
from the trustee in spite of exculpatory clauses. If in addition the trustee
became a pledgee at the time of violation of the covenants, the debenture
holders may clearly share in this pledge.57
If the trustee has knowledge of circumvention of the protective intent of
restrictive covenants through the subsidiary device used by Cuban Cane and
Paramount-Publix, 58 a device likely to become increasingly familiar if the
of the bonds then outstanding shall have made written request upon the Trustee, . . .
nor unless, also, such holders shall have offered the Trustee security and indemnity,
satisfactory to it . . . . and the Trustee -shall have refused or neglected to comply
with such request within a reasonable time thereafter." QUINDRY, Op. Cit. supra note 3,
§§ 89, 117.
55. It would appear that, under the quoted indenture, not even the trustee could sue
to enjoin breach until after the debentures had been matured. The clause cited in
note 53 supra, provides only for suit after failure of the Company to pay an amount
due, and breach of a covenant might well occur without any such failure of payment.
Quaere %,-hether this provision would prevent a court of equity from granting an in-
junction against threate,:ed breach.
56. Y" Y. L. T.. Septcraber 21, 1936, p. 771, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.).
57. C' ae Nat. Bank v. Sweezy, 281 N.Y. Supp. 487 (Sup. Ct. 1931), aff'd, 261
N Y. ; 185 N. E. 803 (1933) ; Kaplan v. Chase Nat. Bank, 156 Misc. 471, 281 N.Y.
Supp ' 2 (Sup. Ct. 1934). No exculpatory clauses appeared in these cases, but if the
tecu: .uu of Hazzard v. Chase Nat. Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 287 N. Y. Supp. 541 (Sup. Ct.
1936"', were followed in similar cases where the trustee is exempted such clauses would
not alter the result. This technique imposed the knowledge of all the officers, directors,
and files of the corporation upon the corporation, 159 Misc. 57, at 75, 287 N.Y. Supp.
541, at 561, and then applied the exculpatory clauses only to the duties which should
aise from such knowledge. chnce participating in a pledge with knowledge of the
ngative pledge clauses would subject the trustee to an equitable lien, there would be
n. question of duty which the exculpatory clauses might alleviate.
58. The trustees of the debenture issues in both these cases were informed of the
subsidiary transaction, and did nothing, if indeed they could have, to protect the de-
benture holders. S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 6, at 13, 98-99.
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possibilities of recovery against pledgee and trustee outlined above are real-
ized, the trustee would be liable only if the transfer to subsidiaries is held
to violate the negative pledge clause.5m But if the courts sustain the use of
the transfer to a subsidiary to circumvent a negative pledge clause, it is
difficult to see upon what basis any liability could be imposed upon a trustee
for its acquiescence in such a scheme.
Where debentures are secured by the deposit of collateral with a trustee,
the rights of the debenture holder rest upon the nature of the trustee's
duties with respect to the preservation of the collateral, and upon the reme-
dies against the trustee for failing to perform these duties. These rights
would seem to be as illusory as those conferred by restrictive covenants. In
the recent case of Haczard v. Chase National BankcO the Jiolders of a
$10,000,000 debenture issue of the National Electric Power Company, an
Insull subsidiary, sued the trustee for allowing the issuer to substitute
worthless holding company stock for the operating company stock originally
deposited. The trust indenture, however, expressly provided for the substi-
tution of other stock upon the certificate of the issuer as to earnings of the
stock to be substituted."' Although the trustee was given the power.to inves-
tigate independently, no such duty was imposed upon it and it could if it
chose treat these earning certificates of the issuer as conclusive on their
face. The indenture further exempted the trustee from liability for the
negligence of any of its agents or for any contingency except its own gross
negligence or bad faith.02 Officers of the issuer were heavily indebted to
the Chase National Bank; the bank was represented on the board bf directors
of the issuer and was the largest single creditor of the issuer. Judge Rosen-
man, after commenting upon the inconsistency of the position of the Chase
Bank as a creditor of the issuer and as trustee under the indenture, was
reluctantly forced to hold that the plaintiffs could not recover from the
bank for its negligence in permitting the withdrawal and substitution. Even
assuming that all the knuwledge that Chase Bank gained by virtue of its
various conflicting positions were imputed to it as trustee, Judge Rosennan
felt bound to hold that by acting within the terms of the indenture the
Chase Bank had successfully avoided the liability which would undoubtedly
have attached in the absence of the exemption clause. Judge Rosenman
commented upon the unrealistic nature of the legal rule which holds purchas-
ers of such a debenture issue to a knowledge of the precise terms of the
indenture as though it were a simple contract.63 Notwithstanding the unfair-
ness of giving effect to exculpatory clauses in indentures, he felt that the
rule was too well settled to be changed by the courts and urged that it be
changed by legislation.
59. See notes 30, 31 supra.
60. 159 Misc. 57, 287 N. Y. Supp. 541 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
61. Id. at 60, 62, 287 N.Y. Supp. at 545, 547.
62. Id. at 62, 287 N.Y. Supp. at 546.
63. Id. at 83, 287 N.Y. Supp. at 569.
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A similar situation was revealed by a Senate Committee Investigation of
the Kreuger and Toll crash.6 A $50,000,000 debenture issue was secured by
the deposit of bonds with a trustee, but the indenture provided for substi-
tution of other bonds within specified categories and on the basis of par
value rather than market value. The trustee was permitted by the indenture
to rely solely upon the certificate of the Kreuger and Toll Company as to
the eligibility of the bonds to be substituted. Shortly before the collapse of
the entire corporate structure the trustee permitted a substitution of bonds
whose market value, at the time of the Senate hearings, was only two-fifths
of those originally deposited. The fact that the inferior bonds were techni-
cally eligible under the indenture did not mitigate the loss of the debenture
holders, but merely precluded any recovery by them against the trustee.
The rule that the terms of the trust indenture are binding upon debenture
holders seems firmly established.65 When it is combined with a power of sub-
stitution of collateral by the issuer which the trustee may permit by relying
on an earnings statement submitted by the issuer, the opportunity for render-
ing the collateral of little value is complete. If the substitution is performed
carelessly, so that the terms of the debenture are not followed, the trustee
is liable. 66 The trustee usually has power to make careful inquiries and
act to protect debenture holders, but is under no duty to do so. 67 It is
protected by the exculpatory clauses of the indenture even from liability for
failing to prevent an observed substitution of worthless security according
to legal forms.68 It may be that the occurrence of actual default would give
rise to active duties.6 9 It is probable that if the trustee actually participates
in the benefits of the withdrawal by taking a lien on the withdrawn security
it is liable.70 It apparently is not so liable where it may possibly have bene-
fited from the substitution because of its position as a large unsecured creditor
of the issuer.71
64. SEN. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 121-123, reported in S.E.C.,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 16.
65. Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1918), cert. denied,
248 U. S. 564 (1918); Benton v. Safe Deposit Bank, 255 N.Y. 260, 174 N.E. 648
(1931); Hazzard v. Chase Nat. Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 287 N.Y. Supp. 541 (Sup. Ct.
1936).
66. Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat. Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N. E. 574 (1930).
67. Hazzard v. Chase Nat. Bank, 159 Misc. 57, at 71, 287 N.Y. Supp. 541, at 557
(Sup. Ct. 1936).
68. Id. at 82, 287 N. Y. Supp. 541, 569.
69. Starr v. Chase Nat. Bank, N. Y. L. J., September 21, 1936, p. 771, col. 6. The
difficulty with this rule is that the substitution of worthless securities and the withdrawal
of valuable ones is likely to b- done, as in the Hazzard and Kreuger and Toll cases,
to stave off default.
70. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Atlantic Coast Electric R. R., 138 Fed. 517 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1905); Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Guaranty Inv. Co., 213 Wis. 415, 250 N. W. 862
(1933).
71. In the Hazzard case, the Chase Bank was the largest single creditor of the
issuer, and obtained security on many of its loans six months prior to the withdrawal.
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The judges who tried the Hamiard and the Kelly cases both concluded that
legislation was necessary if debenture holders are to be given the protection
which covenants in their debentures purport to assure.72 To be completely
effective, any such scheme of legislation would probably require action both
by Congress and by the states chiefly concerned with the business of finance,
unless the Supreme Court treats national powers more generously with
respect to securities regulation than to the national regulation of poultry
marketing or coal mining. Federal legislation, possibly by way of amend-
ment to the Securities Act of 19 33,-a could establish general limitations on
the terms of issuance of such securities; state statutes, without going so far
as to burden the interstate commerce in securities, could regulate the
detailed practices normally referable to local law.74 This comment will he
concerned only with a definition of aims for possible federal legislation in
159 Misc. 57, 63, 287 N.Y. Supp. 541, 548. This freezing of assets may have neces-
sitated the subsequent withdrawal, but it was not considered relevant to the decision.
72. Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 11 F. Supp. 497, 514 (S.D. N.Y.
1935); Hazzard v. Chase National Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 85, 287 N.Y. Supp. 541, 571
(Sup. Ct. 1936).
73. 48 STAT. 74- (1933) as amended by 48 STAT. 9105 (1934) ; 15 U. S. C. § 77 (1935
Supp.). The S. E. C. might undertake measures looking to reform under § 19 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [48 STAT. 881, 898 (1934), 15 U.S. C. §78s (1935
Supp.)] permitting it to prescribe the listing requirements for securities traded on
national exchanges. As the S. E. C. Report points out (S. E. C. op. cit. supra note 6,
at 110) such action would have the dis.dvantage of not reaching securities not traded
on the exchanges, and perhaps of inducing issuers to keep such issues off the exchanges.
There may be disadvantages too in singling out debentures for severe administrative
regulation in advance of a general regulation of the contract terms of securities. See
also Pus. UTiL HOLDING COMPANY AcT, § 7, 49 ST.T. 838, 15 U. S. C. § 79g (1935
Supp.) -
74. The Streit Act, for example, recently passed in New York (L 1936, c. 900,
amending L. 1909, c. 52, REAL PROPER LAw, Art. 4A) makes rules and defines
standards in a comprehensive program to control the management of mortgage invest-
ments secured by New York real estate, or administered by a trustee, bondholders'
protective committee, depositary, management company, voting trustee, or other person
who has an office for the transaction of business with respect to the mortgage invest-
ment within New York, or has obtained authority to do business within the state.
The Streit Act meets many of the objections brought by the S. F. C. against the
administration of investments by trustees (REPORT OF THE S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 6,
III, REAL ESTATE BONDs 4-35, 229, and passim; VI, TausTEs UNDER INDzitrunes
110-111). State legislation of a similar type could do much to accomplish the same
ends, although it would be less effective both from the point of view of administrative
efficiency and of geographical completeness than national regulation. The present power
of some state securities commissions to refuse to authorize the sale of any security
which in their opinion will work a fraud upon the purchaser thereof, CA.i GENr. LAws
(Deering, Supp. 1935) Act 3814, §4; MxcH. Comp. Lws (1929) §9780 as amended
by Pub. Acts, 1935, No. 37, provides an adequate basis for further legislation similar
to the proposed amendments to the Securities Act. See Klagsbrunn, Regulation of
Interstate Security Sales-A Recent Report (1933) 1 U. OF CH 1. L Rv. 83; Vash-
bum & Steig, Control of Securities Selling (1933) 31 Micn. L Rzv. 768.
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this field, not with the administrative and constitutional problem of dis-
tributing powers between state and national agencies of control, or the
draftsman's problem of fitting a new statute into the existing pattern of
statutes and decisions.
Under the present Securities Act, the powers of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission are probably inadequate to reform usage with respect
to covenants in debentures. The Commission has authority under the Act to
refuse to permit a registration statement to become effective 7  or, after a
hearing, to issue a stop order suspending the effectiveness of a registration
statement for the misstatement or omission of a material fact. None of the
administrative interpretations so far made by the S. E. C. suggest thatt the
inclusion in a debenture of covenants such as those proven illusory in the
Kelly and Hazzard cases would be regarded as misleading within the pro-
hibition of § 8 (d) ; but such a result is probably justified by the act. In their
usual form, such covenants in debentures can be classified with the suspected
provisions of those registration statements whose effectiveness the S. E. C.
has suspended on the ground that they convey a false or misleading impres-
sion of safety,76 both for reasons of unintelligibility, and because they often
enhance the attractiveness of securities by promising the investor more than
he can be given.7 7 Thus it might be possible to deny registration to a deben-
ture issue in one of the orthodox forms as misleading, in that it contains
promises easily evaded.
But even if the S. E. C. could now assure the investor that the debenture
provisions purporting to protect him would be written unambiguously, it
could hardly go so far as to outlaw such covenants altogether.78 The first
job of the Securities Act is to require publicity, and while the S. E. C. can
force the disclosure of material facts, it is without authority to pass upon
the investment quality of securities or remake the habits of the financial
community. Without altering the function of the S. E. C., it should be
possible to protect investors by requiring all debentures to comply with
certain requirements of safety before registration can be effective. A legis-
lative scheme to meet some of the general difficulties dramatized in the recent
conflict as to covenants in debentures might be set up somewhat as follows :70
A debenture issue containing no restrictive covenants or provisions for
the deposit of collateral should be permitted registration under terms similar
75. 48 STAT. 74 (1933) as amended by 48 STAT. 905 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 77h (b),
(d) (1934).
76. In re Oil Ridge Oil and Refining Co., S. E. C. Release No. 522, Oct. 15, 1935.
In re Franco Mining Corp., S.E.C. Release No. 650, February 5, 1936. Cf. Comment
(1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1076, 1097-1098.
77. S. E. C. op. cit. supra note 6, at 11.
78. As is suggested as one solution of the problem, S. E. C. op. cit. supra note 6, 11.
79. These suggestions rely heavily on the thorough and vigorous REPORT OF TUE
S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 6, and on the conclusions which have so far been formulated
in it.
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to those imposed upon all securities by the Securities Act. The total lack
of contractual protection in such debentures would be frankly acknowledged
instead of masqueraded behind futile and illusory restrictive covenants or
trust indentures. This type of debenture would permit the issuer the greatest
possible freedom in the handling of its assets, and would direct the attention
of investors to an analysis of going concern values, instead of to ephemeral
rights in liquidation.
The registration statement for a debenture issue which contains restrictive
covenants, however, should not be accepted until the following conditions
are satisfied. (1) To avoid strained interpretations of the existing statute,
the S. E. C. should be given explicit power to refuse registration, or to
issue a stop-order suspending the effectiveness of registration, if it deems
covenants to be ambiguous, or capable of obvious evasion. 0
While this authority in the S. E. C. might be exercised to some effect, it is
naive to suppose that such protection is alone adequate. Granted the mores
of the financial community and the fertile imagination of counsel, as reflected
in the debenture cases discussed above, it is safe to prophesy that any de-
benture covenant, no matter how clear superficially, will be evaded to the
discomfiture of the debenture holder if he has to depend for protection on
litigation brought by himself to remedy breaches of the covenants, rarely
discovered until long after the event. Thus (2), no debenture issue con-
taining restrictive covenants should be allowed registration unless it pro-
vides that a trustee be appointed to protect the rights of the holders.81 The
first phase of this effort should be to make sure that the trustee appointed
for the position be in fact a trustee; trustees should be disqualified strictly
if they have interests incompatible with their fiduciary role.P The second
effort should be to require such trustees to exercise both care and energy
in the interests of the debenture holders. The duties of the trustee should
be to make the restrictive covenants effective by actively pursuing any cause
of action arising under them in favor of debenture holders, regardless of
80. The S. E. C. recommends such a provision, REPoRT. op. cit. supra note 6, at 111.
State Blue Sky Laws often contain analogous provisions. Cf. note 74, .upra. For a
collection of state lavs, see THORPE A.,D ELLIS, FEDERAL SEcurrmis ACT M.AIAL
(1933) § 147, 132 C. C. H. 5503-5984.
81. The S. E. C. REPORT recommends either the abolition of negative pledge clauses
in debentures, or their enforcement by a trustee given more definite responsibility "for
the adequacy of . . . protective features" op. cit. supra note 6, at 11, 16.
82. Thus in Starr v. Chase Nat. Bank, N.Y.L J., September 21, 1936, p. 771,
col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1936), the trustee under the indenture was also a creditor of the issuer,
and sought to satisfy its claim against the issuer without any effort to protect the
interests of the debenture holders. For further instances of inconsistent interests of
trustees, see Hazzard v. Chase National Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 63, 287 N.Y. Supp. 541,
548 (Sup. Ct. 1936). Posner, Liability of the Truslce under the Corporate Indenture
(1928) 42 HARV. L. REv. 198, 226. Cf. STmr Act (note 74, supra) § 127; S. E. C.
REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, 71-109.
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whether or not any request to do so be made by a holder. A vigilant and
active trustee would make available the remedies of injunction against a
contemplated breach of covenant and/or recovery at law from the issuer
before insolvency. Clauses exempting trustees from liability should prevent
registration, 3 and it should be provided that only trustees of sufficient
financial responsibility to meet the needs of the particular issue may be
selected. Although there are some differences in detail, the recent proposals
looking to reform in the conduct of trustees under indentures emphasize the
same elements as essential to an effective code for trustees.8 4 The trustee
must be made an active trustee, and given specific duties. Although the
imposition of active duties and liability for ordinary negligence upon the
trustee would make necessary higher fees for this type of service, the
debenture holders would be getting fiduciary protection, as Judge Rosenman
pointed out in the Hazgard case.8 5
(3) A further change, though one less generally supported than the pro-
posals for the reform of trustee's conduct under indentures, relates to the
effect of an effective registration statement as notice. It is suggested, though
with reservations, that registration of the issue with the S. E. C. should be
considered a presumption of notice of the terms of negative pledge clauses
to all who deal with the issuing corporation." This may seem an unnecessary
precaution if an active and financially responsible trustee is answerable for
the performance of the covenants, but unless the trustee is made an insurer,
there may arise cases in which it would be desirable that an effective cause of
action against third parties be available to debenture holders. Suppose that
an issuer succeeds in pledging assets as collateral for a bank loan, for
83. For discussion, see Hazzard v. Chase National Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 80, 287 N.Y.
Supp. 541, 566 (Sup. Ct. 1936) ; and Payne, Exculpatory Clauses in Corporate Mort-
gages and other Instruments (1934) 19 CoRN. L. Q. 171; Comment (1933) 33 CoL. L.
REv. 97; S. E. C. REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 67-70.
84. Most conspicuously the S. E. C. REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 110-111; Streit
Act, (note 74, supra) § 126. The Streit Act does not in terms forbid clauses limiting
the liability of trustees.
85. Hazzard v. Chase National Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 84-85, 287 N. Y. Supp. 541,
571 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
86. It may be difficult to provide for such consequences of registration for only one
class of security; perhaps, however, the publicity now attending registration will in the
future make the proof of actual knowledge easier as to all facts contained in registra-
tion statements,, without statutory presumptions, at least as to persons, like bankers,
waose business it is to know the affairs of their customers. Cf. p. 106 supra. Regis-
tration of debentures under the English Companies Act 1900, 63 & 64 VIcT. c. 48,
while notice of the floating charge, was held not to be notice of the restrictive covenants.
Re Standard Rotary Machine Co., 95 L. T. 829 (Ch. D. 1906); Wilson v. Kelland
[10101 2 Ch. 306 (Ch. D.); G. & T. Earle, Ltd. v. Hemsworth R. D. C., 44 T. L. R.
605 (K. B. Div., 1928) aff'd 44 T. L. R. 758 (C. A. 1928). A specific statement that
re istration was notice of the restrictive covenants would cure this defect.
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example, in violation of a covenant, despite the diligence of the trustee. A
difficulty barring such action has been the proof of the' pledgee's actual
knowledge of the terms of the covenant allegedly breached by the pledgeP
Since it is inconceivable that large banking institutions about to make a sub-
stantial loan to a corporation do not discover, in the process of credit investi-
gation, the terms of a borrower's outstanding issues, and base the loan in
part on an assessment of their legal consequences, it does not seem unreason-
able to presume such knowledge on the part of the pledgee, so that recovery
of the pledged assets by the debenture holders can be supported on orthodox
grounds. The filing of registration statements for debentures with the S. E. C.
in Washington and with the regional offices throughout the country would
make the terms of negative pledge clauses reasonably accessible. Such a
presumption should minimize the difficulty of proving actual knowledge in
these cases. It remains to be seen whether Judge Mack will find in the
peculiar circumstances of the Kclt, case 8 that the pledgee banks actually knew
of the negative pledge clauses in the debentures. Other cases have inferred
actual knowledge rather freely,89 and it may be that a statutory presumption
is unnecessary to achieve the end sought.
When the nature of the issuer's business makes it feasible to deposit assets
with a trustee, as security for a debenture, registration should be withheld
unless the trust indenture complies with the following conditions: the terms
of deposit should be defined, and the nature of the collateral specified. Sub-
stitution should only be permitted with the approval of the trustee, when the
substituted collateral satisfies stated criteria of equivalence as to market value
and earnings history. No exculpatory clauses in favor of the trustee should
be permitted.
The effect of imposing these conditions upon the registration of debenture
issues containing restrictive covenants or collateral trust indentures is to
put the S. E. C. in a position to bargain effectively for the debenture holders
instead of permitting their rights to be determined, as they are today, by
the adversely interested issuer and trustee. A legislative scheme sufficiently
comprehensive to protect debenture holders by providing for the adequate
enforcement of restrictive covenants and collateral trust agreements might
seem unduly to restrict an issuer in the control and disposition of its assets.
Strict enforcement of such restrictions may even impair the protective qualities
87. Cf. p. 106 mtpra.
88. Ibid.
89. Hazzard v. Chase National Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 75, 287 N.Y. Supp. 541, 561
(Sup. Ct. 1936) (Knowledge imputed to trustee is "the sum total of all the Imowledge
and information which its various officers themselves had, as officers, and also the
material which vwas contained in the various credit and investment files of the bank
on that date"). Cf. Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 497,
502, n. 5 (S.D. N.Y. 1935) (virtually identical circumstances) ; Starr v. Chase National
Bank, N. Y. L. J., September 21, 1936, p. 771, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
